Part
III
The judiciary during the Repression
Nunca Más
(Never Again) - Report of Conadep
- 1984
Once it
has been clearly demonstrated that an enormous number of people
disappeared and thousands of abductions were carried out
involving the deployment of a great many vehicies and men, that
big, well-organized detention and torture centres situated in
densely populated areas housed hundreds of rapidly changing
prisoners, and that the families of the disappeared exhausted
practically all the available legal procedures, the following
questions have to be asked: 'How could so many crimes with the
same modus operandi and often with numerous witnesses be carried
out with such impunity? How was it that judges failed to locate
a single kidnap victim, even after the experiences of those
fortunate enough to have been released had been public knowledge
for several years? What prevented them from investigating a
single one of those detention centres? These are painful
questions, but they must be clarified.
After
the Armed Forces took power on 24 March 1976, Argentine
institutions were drastically subverted. A kind of
'executive-legislative-constituent power' was created. it
assumed extraordinary governmental powers and supreme public
authority.
The
composition of the highest levels of the judiciary, that is, the
Supreme Court, the Attorney-General, the Provincial High Courts,
changed on the first day of the coup. At the same time all other
members of the judiciary were suspended from duty. All judges,
whether newly appointed or confirmed in their posts, had to
swear to uphold the Articles and objectives of the 'Process'
instigated by the Military Junta.
From
then on, the activities of the judiciary assumed very
distinctive features. Although intended by the Supreme Law of
the Nation to protect citizens from excesses of authority, it
now condoned the usurpation of power and allowed a host of
judicial aberrations to take on the appearance of legality. With
a few exceptions, it recognized the discretionary application of
the powers of arrest under the state of siege, and accepted the
validity of secret reports from the security services as
justification for the detention of citizens for an indefinite
period. At the same time, it turned the writ of habeas corpus
into a mere formality, rendering it totally inefficient as a
means of combating the policy of forcible abduction.
Instead
of acting as a brake on the prevailing absolutism as it should
have done, the judiciary became a sham jurisdictional structure,
a cover to protect its image. Free expression of ideas in the
press was denied through control of the mass media and through
self-censorship practised as a result of the state terrorism
unleashed on dissident journalists. Legal representation in
court was seriously affected by the imprisonment, exile or death
of defence lawyers. The reluctance and even complacency with
regard to human rights shown by many judges complete the picture
of a total absence of protection for Argentine citizens.
Nevertheless,
there were judges who, in the face of tremendous pressure,
carried out their duties with the dignity and decency expected
of them. It is also true, however, that although it is a judge's
duty to protect individuals and their property, many did not do
so. Many who could have limited the abuses of arbitrary
detention endorsed the imposition of sentences without trial.
And many showed complicity with the abductions and
disappearances by their indifference. People came to feel that
it was useless to appeal to the judiciary for protection of
their basic rights. This situation became so notorious
internationally that a Swiss court once refused to extradite
five Argentines even though all the requirements of the relative
treaty had been met, on the grounds that the lives of the
criminals, once extradited, could not be guaranteed.
Our
conclusion is that during the period in which large numbers of
people disappeared, the judicial process became almost
inoperative as a means of appeal. Furthermore, it could almost
be said that under the military regime, the right to life,
security of person and individual liberty had little to do with
the decisions of the judges; the sole arbiters of these
decisions were the members of the State's repressive apparatus.
The
following cases are eloquent proof of this:
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